Ich setze mir noch ein paar Marker für die Vorträge vom 36C3, welche ich mir unbedingt anschauen möchte:
It is easier to chat online securely today than it ever has been. Widespread adoption of signal, wire, and the private mode of WhatsApp have led a broader recognition of the importance of end-to-end encryption. There’s still plenty of work to be done in finding new designs that balance privacy and usability in online communication.
This introduction to secure messaging will lay out the different risks that are present in communications, and talk about the projects and techniques under development to do better.
The talk will begin with a threat modeling exercise to be able to concretely talk about the different actors and potential risks that a secure messaging system can attempt to address. From there, we’ll dive into end-to-end encryption, OTR and deniability, and then the axolotl construction used by Signal (and now the noise framework).
The bulk of the talk will focus on the rest of the problem which is more in-progress, and in particular consider the various metadata risks around communication. We’ll survey the problems that can arise around contact discovery, network surveillance, and server compromise. In doing so, we’ll look at the forays into communication systems that attempt to address these issues. Pond offered a novel design point for discovery and a global network adversary. Katzenpost adapts mixnets to limit the power of network adversaries and server compromise in a different way. Private Information Retrieval (PIR) trades off high server costs for a scheme that could more realistically work with mobile clients. Others, for instance Secure Scuttlebutt attempt to remove the need for infrastructural servers entirely with gossip and partial views of the network, a whole other set of tradeoffs.
Seit Anfang 2019 hat David jeden einzelnen Halt jeder einzelnen Zugfahrt auf jedem einzelnen Fernbahnhof in ganz Deutschland systematisch gespeichert. Inklusive Verspätungen und allem drum und dran. Und die werden wir in einem bunten Vortrag erforschen und endlich mal wieder ein bisschen Spaß mit Daten haben.
Rechtlicher Hinweis: Es liegt eine schriftliche Genehmigung der Bahn vor, von ihr abgerufene Rohdaten aggregieren und für Vorträge nutzen zu dürfen. Inhaltliche Absprachen oder gar Auflagen existieren nicht.
Die Bahn gibt ihre Verspätungen in „Prozent pünktlicher Züge pro Monat“ an. Das ist so radikal zusammengefasst, dass man daraus natürlich nichts interessantes lesen kann. Jetzt stellt euch mal vor, man könnte da mal ein bisschen genauer reingucken.
Stellt sich raus: Das geht! Davids Datensatz umfasst knapp 25 Millionen Halte – mehr als 50.000 pro Tag. Wir haben die Rohdaten und sind in unserer Betrachtung völlig frei.
Der Vortrag hat wieder mehrere rote Fäden.
1) Wir vermessen ein fast komplettes Fernverkehrsjahr der deutschen Bahn. Hier etwas Erwartungsmanagement: Sinn ist keinesfalls Bahn-Bashing oder Sensationsheischerei – wer einen Hassvortrag gegen die Bahn erwartet, ist in dieser Veranstaltung falsch. Wir werden die Daten aber nutzen, um die Bahn einmal ein bisschen kennenzulernen. Die Bahn ist eine riesige Maschine mit Millionen beweglicher Teile. Wie viele Zugfahrten gibt es überhaupt? Was sind die größten Bahnhöfe? Wir werden natürlich auch die unerfreulichen Themen ansprechen, für die sich im Moment viele interessieren: Ist das Problem mit den Zugverspätungen wirklich so schlimm, wie alle sagen? Gibt es Orte und Zeiten, an denen es besonders hapert? Und wo fallen Züge einfach aus?
2) Es gibt wieder mehrere Blicke über den Tellerrand, wie bei Davids vorherigen Vorträgen auch. Ihr werdet wieder ganz automatisch und nebenher einen allgemeinverständlichen Einblick in die heutige Datenauswerterei bekommen. (Eine verbreitete Verschwörungsheorie sagt, euch zur Auswertung öffentlicher Daten zu inspirieren, wäre sogar der Hauptzweck von Davids Vorträgen. 🙂 )Die Welt braucht Leute mit Ratio, die Analyse wichtiger als Kreischerei finden. Und darum beschreibt davod auch, wie man so ein durchaus aufwändiges Hobbyprojekt technisch angeht, Anfängerfehler vermeidet, und verantwortungsvoll handelt.
So called “0-click” exploits, in which no user interaction is required to compromise a mobile device, have become a highly interesting topic for security researchers, and not just because Apple announced a one million dollar bug bounty for such exploits against the iPhone this year. This talk will go into the details of how a single memory corruption vulnerability in iMessage was remotely exploited to compromise an iPhone. The insights gained from the exploitation process will hopefully help defend against such attacks in the future.
This talk will dive into the internals of an iMessage exploit that achieves unsandboxed remote code execution on vulnerable devices (all iPhones and potentially other iDevices up to iOS 12.4) without user interaction and within a couple of minutes. All that is necessary for a successful attack in a default configuration is knowledge of the target’s phone number or an email address. Further, the attack is also possible without any visible indicators of the attack displayed to the user.
First, an overview of the general iMessage software architecture will be given, followed by an introduction of the exploited vulnerability. Next, a walkthrough of the exploitation process, including details about how the various exploit mitigations deployed on iOS were bypassed, will be presented. Some of the exploitation techniques are rather generic and should be applicable to exploit other vulnerabilities, messengers, and even other platforms such as Android. Along the way, some advice will be shared with the audience on how to bootstrap research in this area. The talk concludes with a set of suggestions for mobile OS and messenger vendors on how to mitigate the demonstrated exploit techniques effectively and hopefully make these kinds of attacks significantly more difficult/costly to perform in the future. While previous experience with iOS userland exploitation will not be required for this talk, some basic background knowledge on memory corruption vulnerabilities is recommended.
From Unanimity to Anonymity
The people of Hong Kong have been using unique tactics, novel uses of technology, and a constantly adapting toolset in their fight to maintain their distinctiveness from China since early June. Numerous anonymous interviews with protesters from front liners to middle class supporters and left wing activists reveal a movement that has been unfairly simplified in international reporting. The groundbreaking reality is less visible because it must be – obfuscation and anonymity are key security measures in the face of jail sentences up to ten years.
Instead of the big political picture, this talk uses interviews with a range of activists to help people understand the practicalities of situation on the ground and how it relates to Hongkong’s political situation. It also provides detailed insights into protestors‘ organisation, tactics and technologies way beyond the current state of reporting. Ultimately, it is the story of how and why Hongkongers have been able to sustain their movement for months, even faced with an overwhelming enemy like China.
This is the story of how and why Hongkongers have been able to sustain their movement so long, even faced with an overwhelming enemy like China. The protestors have developed a range of tactics that have helped them minimise capture and arrests and helped keep the pressure up for five months: They include enforcing and maintaining anonymity, both in person and online, rapid dissemination of information with the help of the rest of the population, a policy of radical unanimity to maintain unity in the face of an overwhelming enemy and Hongkongers’ famous “be water” techniques, through which many of them escaped arrest.
How thousands of Facebook, You Tube and Instagram pages benefited from purchased likes and how we reverse engineered facebooks user IDs
This talk investigates the business of fake likes and fake accounts: In a world, where the number of followers, likes, shares and views are worth money, the temptation and the will to cheat is high. With some luck, programming knowledge and persistence we obtained thousands of fanpages, You Tube and Instagram account, where likes have been bought from a Likes seller. We were also able to meet people working behind the scenes and we will prove, that Facebook is a big bubble, with a very high percentage of dead or at least zombie accounts. The talk presents the methodology, findings and outcomes from a team of scientists and investigative journalists, who delved into the parallel universe of Fake Like Factories.
When you hear about fake likes and fake accounts, you instantly think of mobile phones strung together in multiple lines in front of an Asian woman or man. What if we tell you, that this is not necessarily the whole truth? That you better imagine a ordinary guy sitting at home at his computer? In a longterm investigation we met and talked to various of these so called “clickworkers” – liking, watching, clicking Facebook, You Tube and Instagram for a small amount of money the whole day in their living room.
Fortuitously we could access thousand campaigns, Facebook Fanpages, You Tube videos or Instagram accounts. Thousands of websites and accounts, for which somebody bought likes in the past years.
But we did not stop the investigation there: We dived deeper into the Facebook Fake Accounts and Fake Likes universe, bought likes at various other Fake Likes sellers. To get the big picture, we also developed a statistical method to calculate the alleged total number of Facebok User IDs, with surprising results.
Dort wo sich Physik und Philosophie treffen ist es Zeit, über Zeit zu sprechen.
In this talk Julian will outline his work as sysadmin, systems and security architect for the climate and environmental defense movement Extinction Rebellion. Responsible for 30 server deployments in 11 months, including a community hub spanning dozens of national teams (some of which operate in extremely hostile conditions), he will show why community-owned free and open source infrastructure is mission-critical for the growth, success and safety of global civil disobedience movements.
An extension of an earlier talk at C-Base Berlin, Julian will give an overview of his own discoveries, platform choices, successes and mistakes meeting the needs of 5-figure at-risk server memberships, from geo-political and legal challenges, to arrest opsec and uptime resilience in the face of powerful adversaries driving attacks on infrastructure and seized activist devices spanning many countries before and during periods of mass civil disobedience. In particular the talk is a call for all sysadmins, opsec and infosec professionals and enthusiasts to rise up and join the fight for current and future generations of all life.